Monopolistic Intermediation in the Gehrig (1993) Search Model Revisited by Lörtscher, Simon
D
is
ku
ss
io
ns
sc
hr
ift
en
 
Monopolistic Intermediation in the  
Gehrig (1993) Search Model Revisited 
 
 
Simon Lörtscher 
 
 
03-20 
 
December 2003 
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
d
o
i
.
o
r
g
/
1
0
.
7
8
9
2
/
b
o
r
i
s
.
1
4
4
0
8
9
 
|
 
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
:
 
2
7
.
1
2
.
2
0
2
0
Universität Bern 
Volkswirtschaftliches Institut 
Gesellschaftstrasse 49 
3012 Bern, Switzerland 
Tel: 41 (0)31 631 45 06 
Web: www.vwi.unibe.ch 
Monopolistic Intermediation in the Gehrig (1993)
Search Model Revisited
Simon Lörtscher∗
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Abstract
We modify the basic Gehrig (1993) model. In this model, individual
agents are either buyers or sellers. They can choose between joining the
search market, joining the monopolistic intermediary or remaining inac-
tive. In the search market, agents are randomly matched and the price at
which exchange takes place is set bilaterally. If agents join the intermedi-
ary, buyers have to pay an ask price set in advance by the intermediary.
Likewise, if sellers decide to deal through the intermediary, they get the bid
price set by the intermediary. As Gehrig shows, this model has an equi-
librium in which the search market and the market of the monopolistic
intermediary are simultaneously open. The intermediary makes positive
profits because he trades at a positive ask-bid spread, and the set of indi-
vidual agents is tripartite: High valuation buyers and low cost sellers deal
through the intermediary, buyers and sellers with average valuations and
average costs are active in the search market, and low valuation buyers and
high cost sellers remain inactive. We modify this basic model by imposing
a sequential structure. We assume that the monopolistic intermediary first
has to buy the good from sellers on the input market before he can sell it
to buyers on the output market. As a consequence of the sequential struc-
ture, the subgame following capacity setting has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium with an active search market. On the equilibrium path, the
equilibrium analyzed by Gehrig is replicated.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
A question models of perfect competition leave unanswered is which institution
coordinates the decisions of the great number of agents necessary for perfect
competition to work. While attributing the role of the coordination mechanism
to prices, these models typically remain silent about the origin of these prices.
A second issue that remains open is how exchange of the goods takes place. If
a thousand sellers and thousand buyers trade some good at a given price, these
models do not say how and where the agents exchange the good. Since questions
relating to the microstructure of markets are not treated in these models, the
microeconomic model of perfect competition can be said to lack a microeconomic
foundation.
In this (and a forthcoming companion) paper, we deal with some of these
questions. Building on the work of Gehrig (1993), we study a model in which a
monopolistic intermediary coordinates the decisions of buyers and sellers willing
to trade with him at the ask and bid prices he quotes. Another subset of buyers
and sellers is active in a search market where goods are exchanged without the
intermediary’s services. In this model, (ask and bid) prices originate from a profit
seeking intermediary. The intermediary establishes the exchange of the good for
those traders who are willing to trade through him, while prices in the search
market are determined through a bargaining process and the good is exchanged
from an individual seller to an individual buyer. Intermediation is a profitable
business because search market participants are matched at random and therefore
those buyers and sellers who could exchange the good with the greatest mutual
benefit will, in general, not find each other. As a consequence, the search market
will not exhaust all potential gains from trade. The dispersed rather than the
asymmetric nature of information gives thus rise to profitable intermediation.
Therefore, the model departs from the strand of literature focussing on asymme-
tries of information that give rise to - financial - intermediaries (e.g. Diamond
and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984; Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Dixit, 2001). The
intermediary in our type of model does not reduce or eliminate inefficiencies due
to informational advantages of one party involved in trade and its strategic use
thereof. What intermediation in this type of model achieves is that those buyers
and sellers who have the most to gain can trade with greater certainty and at a
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price which leaves them a greater gain than they can expect from search market
participation.
We think there is a fair justification to not a priori distinguish between fi-
nancial intermediaries like banks or insurance companies on the one hand and
non-financial intermediaries like retailers on the other hand. After all, why should
financial intermediaries by their very nature be characterized as mitigating in-
efficiencies due to asymmetries of information while non-financial intermediaries
arise for some other reasons, like, say, increasing returns to scale? Of course, it
is beyond question that asymmetric information is important for the businesses
financial intermediaries are engaged in. The requirement of a collateral in credit
contracts is hard to understand without referring to asymmetric information. But
granting this does not imply that such asymmetries are of no or only of minor im-
portance in other industries like, say, retailing. A simple transaction like buying
food can involve considerable uncertainties and risks because quality differences
can be hard to detect for customers before consuming the good. Therefore, re-
ducing these uncertainties may just be one of the services provided by retailers.
This is very similar to the services provided by a financial intermediary, whose
job consists among other things of making sure that the credit-takers are worth
the credits given. In retailing, intermediaries make sure that the producers are
worth the credit the consumers give them when buying their products. Accord-
ingly, the fees retailers charge to producers are just the analogue to the collateral
banks require when they give credit. Thus, the non-financial intermediary may
mitigate the same sort of problems arising from asymmetric information as fi-
nancial intermediaries.1 On the other hand, retailing is certainly a profitable
business for other reasons, too. It allows customers to find at less cost what
they are looking for. This sort of service is provided by banks as well, of course.
Though a person might find a more profitable opportunity for a credit contract
outside a bank, searching for such an opportunity typically involves the costs of
time spent searching for (and the risk of not finding) this opportunity. Hence,
financial and non-financial intermediaries might provide basically the same sort
of services with respect to the dispersed nature of information, too, namely that
of mitigating or eliminating search cost.
1See also Friedman (1962, p.146) for a suggestion to view retailers as providing, among other
things, these kinds of services.
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The immediate goal of the present research is to incorporate Cournot (or
Cournot-like) competition between intermediaries into the model set out by Gehrig
(1993). In order to do so, we have to modify the model in two main ways. First,
we introduce a dynamic (or sequential) structure, so that the intermediary can
only start selling after he has finished buying. As a consequence of this sequen-
tial structure, the number of (subgame perfect) equilibria is reduced considerably.
This is what we do in this present paper. In a companion paper, we then intro-
duce competition between capacity constrained intermediaries à la Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983).
This paper is also related to Spulber (1996), Rust and Hall (2003) and Nee-
man and Vulkan (2002). What distinguishes this paper from Spulber’s and Rust
and Hall’s work is that though we introduce a dynamic structure, our model is
basically a static one-shot game. Its structure is the same as that of a partial equi-
librium model, with the exception that a ”central market place” is not taken as
given. This is also what makes the difference to Neeman and Vulkan (2002), who
study whether agents will choose to trade in a decentralized or in a centralized
market, but do not explain how the centralized market operates. An important
contrast to Spulber (1996) is that the prices the intermediary sets are publicly
observable. Dixit (2001) finally studies profit maximizing intermediation in a
model where the basic informational friction is the trust-worthiness of individ-
ual agents. Intermediaries in his model provide information about past behavior
of agents and enforce contracts. However, extending our model to asymmetric
information is beyond the scope of the present and the companion paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes, the basic model.
Section 3 derives the solution of the dynamic intermediation game, and Section
4 concludes. Discussions of issues concerning rationing and the structure of the
Gehrig model are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
Our model world consists of a large number of individuals who can engage in
trade in a decentralized (search) market. More specifically, there is a continuum of
buyers willing to buy one unit of an indivisible good of homogenous quality (which
is known to every one). Their preferences are described by reservation prices r
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which are uniformly distributed over the unit interval, r ∼ U [0, 1] . If a buyer
with reservation price r buys the product at price p (where the volunteer nature
of exchange and individual rationality require p ≤ r), his utility gain is r−p. This
generates an aggregate demand schedule D(p) = 1 − p, p ∈ [0, 1], which can be
interpreted as a (Walrasian) market demand. Analogously, sellers’ preferences are
described by reservation prices or unit costs of production s which are uniformly
distributed on the unit interval [0, 1]. If a seller with reservation price s sells the
product at price p (where again volunteer exchange under individual rationality
requires p ≥ s), his utility gain is p− s, so that aggregate supply is S(p) = p, p ∈
[0, 1]. A buyer with reservation price r owns another good that he can exchange
for the good in question. This good is called money. We assume that buyers have
money and that sellers accept money in exchange for the good. Given the demand
function D(p) = 1 − p and the supply function S(p) = p, the Walrasian market
outcome is characterized by price pW = 1
2
and quantity exchanged QW = 1
2
.
At the core of the model is the assumption that there is no benevolent auc-
tioneer quoting market clearing prices and coordinating trading activities at zero
costs. Therefore, the agents are forced to establish the allocation by their own
actions. The dispersed nature of information makes search for a trading partner
costly insofar as search is time consuming and involves uncertainty. Following
Gehrig, we assume that only individuals with expected utility gain from search
market participation greater than zero enter the search market. When buyers
and sellers enter the search market, they are matched at random by some match-
ing technology. As Spulber (1999, p. 561) observes, the search market is static
in the sense that search market participants are randomly and pairwise matched
at most once. Gehrig (1993, p.102/3, emphasis added) describes the matching
technology as follows:
The technology is such that each market participant on the short side
of the market is matched with some probability λ ∈ [0, 1] with an
agent of the opposite type. The matching probabilities of agents on
the long side consequently are adjusted by the relative numbers and,
therefore, less than λ.
When a seller and a buyer are matched, they bargain over the price. We
briefly review the most prominent bargaining procedures and then explain why
we choose an even sharing rule.
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Brief Review of Bargaining Procedures In Gehrig (1993), search mar-
ket offers are take-it-or-leave-it offers and the trader who can make the offer is
determined by nature. Accordingly, agents’ reservation prices are always private
information, so that the trader who makes the offer does not know the reservation
of the other trader. Consequently, the optimal offer depends on (the distribu-
tion of) traders active in the search market. As an alternative, Spulber (1999)
suggests to introduce alternating offers à la Rubinstein (1982) so as to get rid of
the asymmetry of information inherent in the assumption that reservation prices
are private information in the bargaining process. In a Rubinstein alternating
offers game, both reservation prices and subjective discount factors are assumed
to be knowledge common to both parties engaged in the process. Finally, Freixas
and Rochet (1997, exercise 2.1) assume that reservation prices are known when a
buyer and a seller have been successfully matched and that the two parties share
the gains from trade r − s evenly, provided r − s > 0. (If r − s ≤ 0 there is
no trade.) We refer to this as the solution under an even sharing rule. Interest-
ingly, this corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution (Mas-Collel et al., 1995,
p. 842).2
Even Sharing Lacking a generally accepted theory and/or robust empirical
evidence about people’s bargaining behavior, one procedure is as good as any
other. However, it should be noted that the even sharing rule coincides with the
expected payoff of the Rubinstein alternating offers game if both players have
the same discount factor and if both players have the same chance of making
the first offer. (This is shown in Appendix B.) Since for the game as a whole,
it is this expected payoff that matters only, the even sharing rule can therefore
be seen as a combination of the Gehrig and the Spulber-Rubinstein procedure if
the person who makes the first offer is determined by nature. Moreover, because
adding a Rubinstein bargaining game to the last stage of the game (with nature
determining the first mover) yields the same results as simply assuming that
the gains from trade are shared evenly, we assume that buyers and sellers who
are successfully matched learn each other’s reservation price and then share the
2The Nash bargaining solution is the partition p which maximizes
∏
i∈N Ui(p), where Ui(p)
is individual i’s utility gain under p. Denote the aggregate utility gain from cooperation by U .
In our case, U = r − s := x > 0, Uσ = p, Uβ = x − p, so that
∏
i∈N Ui = UσUβ = p(x − p),
which is maximized at p = x2 .
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gains from trade evenly. Not doing so would only make the whole game more
cumbersome and necessitate a lot of notation not needed otherwise.3
The Dynamic Intermediation Game
Next we describe the dynamic intermediation game with a monopolistic inter-
mediary. The main differences to the original model is the time structure of
the game and as a consequence of this, a reduction of the number of (subgame
perfect) equilibria with an active search market (see Gehrig, 1993; Freixas and
Rochet, 1997; Spulber, 1999). In Appendix A.2 we also clarify what happens
with agents who get rationed by the intermediary.
In the presence of intermediation, buyers and sellers face three decisions. They
can either join the intermediary, enter the search market or choose to remain
inactive. Using Gehrig’s notation, we denote by Iσ (Iβ) the set of all sellers
(buyers) who join the intermediary. The set of sellers (buyers) active in the
search market is denoted by Sσ (Sβ), and the set of sellers (buyers) who decide
not to be active is denoted by Zσ (Zβ). Finally, we denote by Ωσ (Ωβ) the set of all
sellers (buyers), so that by definition Zσ ≡ Ωσ\(Iσ ∪ Sσ) and Zβ ≡ Ωβ\(Iβ ∪ Sβ).
The (Lebesgue) measure of these sets is denoted by υ(.).
In the first stage, the intermediary sets a maximum quantity he is willing
to buy q, to which we refer as a capacity constraint, and he quotes the bid
price b at which he is willing to buy. Sellers decide whether they want to sell
to the intermediary. In the second stage, which begins after buying is finished,
the intermediary sets the ask price a at which he is willing to sell. Buyers decide
whether they want to join the intermediary. It is assumed that the intermediary’s
prices and the sets of individuals joining the intermediary are observed by all
agents without costs. In the presence of an intermediary, the market where
buyers interact with the intermediary will be called output market and the place
where sellers interact with the intermediary will be called input market. The
intermediary is also assumed to accept money in exchange for the good. Because
the intermediary first buys and then sells, he is assumed to have enough money
to buy from the sellers the quantity he wants to buy.
The intermediary must have two technologies individual search market traders
do not have. The first one is an information or communication technology, i.e.
3This is the same motivation as in Rubinstein and Wolinksy (1987, p. 283).
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the capacity to communicate to all traders the prices at which he is willing to
trade. The second one is the capacity to trade the volume the intermediary wants
to trade (counters, transportation facilities etc.), which will be referred to as
capacity constraint. If more sellers join the intermediary than he can serve given
his capacity constraint, some sellers get rationed. Likewise, if more buyers join
the intermediary than he can serve, some buyers will get rationed. Throughout,
we assume that sellers and buyers who get rationed by the intermediary cannot
go back to the search market.
Let us summarize. The intermediation game with a monopolistic intermediary
has three stages.
1. Input Market: The intermediary determines a maximum quantity - a
capacity constraint q - he is willing to buy and sets a bid price b. After
observing b, sellers decide simultaneously whether to join the intermediary.
Up to q, the intermediary is obliged to buy any quantity sellers want to
sell to him. For all those sellers who join the intermediary, the game is
over, regardless of whether they can actually sell or not.4 When a seller
with cost s has joined the intermediary, this information becomes public.
Accordingly, the aggregate quantity bought by the intermediary, denoted
as qb, becomes public information, too. These assumptions imply that
qb = min[q, υ(Iσ)].
2. Output Market: On the output market, the intermediary sets an ask
price a at which he has to sell any quantity buyers want to buy up to his
whole stock qb. If υ(Iβ) < q
b, the intermediary can dispose of the extra
units for free. For buyers who decide to join the intermediary the game is
over, regardless of whether they can buy or get rationed. The set of buyers
who have joined the intermediary is observed by all players remaining in
the game.
3. Search Market: Sellers and buyers who have not joined the intermediary
may join the search market. Those who participate in the search market
meet randomly. The matching technology is such that all traders in the
search market are matched with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] if the set of sellers and
4See Appendix A.2.
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buyers active in the search market have the same measure. Otherwise, the
traders on the long side of the search market are matched with probability
γiλ, where γi =
υ(Ij)
υ(Ii)
< 1 with i = σ, β, j 6= i. There is no further possibility
to trade after a match has been established. For those who are not matched,
the game is over. A buyer r and a seller s who are successfully matched
share the gains from trade evenly by agreeing on the price r−s
2
if r− s > 0.
If r − s ≤ 0, they do not exchange the good. After that, the game is over.
Strategies There are three types of agents, sellers s, buyers r and the monop-
olistic intermediary I. A strategy for seller s is
τs = (Is(b, q); Ss(a, b, q, Iσ, Iβ)) . (1)
Similarly, for a buyer a strategy is
ρr = (Ir(a, b, q, Iσ, ), Sr(a, b, q, Iσ, Iβ)) , (2)
where the functions Ii(.) and Si(.) specify the conditions under which agent i
joins the intermediary or the search market, respectively, i = s, r. Note that
both for sellers and buyers, we do not have to specify the decision to be inactive,
because it is contained in the case where an agent decides to join neither the
intermediary nor the search market. Finally, for the intermediary, a strategy is
ϕ = (q, b; a(Iσ)) , (3)
where q and b are real positive numbers and a(Iσ) is a real valued function. In
general, a strategy for this game is a complicated expression, because there are
many states of the world for which each agent must have a complete contingent
plan. For example, every small change in the set of sellers deciding to join the
intermediary will require a different optimal response by all other players in sub-
sequent periods. Since there is an infinity of such contingencies, it will not be
possible to write down these strategies in closed forms in general.
3 Results
We first show that a slight modification of Proposition 1 of Gehrig (1993) applies
for the dynamic intermediation game with even sharing, so that the space over
which strategies must be defined can be reduced considerably.
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Proposition 1 (Gehrig (1993), Proposition 1) In any equilibrium with an
active search market,5 there are critical reservation values r and r, such that the
set of buyers can be partitioned into three subsets . If r ∈ [0, r), then r ∈ Zβ; if
r ∈ [r, r], then r ∈ Sβ and if r(r, 1], then r ∈ Iβ. There are critical unit costs
s and s, such that the set of sellers can be partitioned into three subsets (in any
equilibrium with an active search market). If s ∈ [0, s), then s ∈ Iσ; if s ∈ [s, s],
then s ∈ Sσ and if s ∈ (s, 1], then s ∈ Zσ.
The Proposition is proved with the help of the following three Lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Gehrig (1993), Lemma 1) For any positive ask bid spread a−b >
0, some traders will be active in the search market.
Proof : Buyers with r < a and sellers with s > b can expect positive utility
gains from search market participation.¥
Lemma 2 (Gehrig (1993), Lemma 2) In equilibrium, the sets of inactive buy-
ers and sellers, Zβ and Zσ, are closed and convex sets such that 0 ∈ Zβ and
1 ∈ Zσ.
Proof : Let buyer r be inactive and suppose r̃ < r is active. Then r could
imitate r̃ and get at least his payoff, whereas his payoff when inactive is zero.
Completely symmetric reasoning applies for sellers. Finally, buyer 0 and seller 1
remain inactive because they never expect a positive gain from trade.¥
Lemma 3 (Modification of Lemma 3, Gehrig (1993)) In any equilibrium
with an active search market (i.e. Sσ 6= ∅, Sβ 6= ∅),
(i) r0 ∈ Sβ ⇒ r /∈ Iβ for r < r0 and
(ii) s0 ∈ Sσ ⇒ s /∈ Iσ for s > s0.
Proof : Parts of the proof very closely mimic the one by Gehrig (1993). We
denote by αi, i = σ, β a seller’s and a buyer’s probability of being rationed when
joining the intermediary. This probability is the same regardless of the seller’s
5We have added this phrase because there is also an equilibrium where no one joins the
search market. If no one goes to the search market, unilateral deviation to join the search
market does obviously not pay. However, as long as there is no fix cost of joining the search
market, in this equilibrium, two continua of agents play weakly dominated strategies.
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and buyer’s valuations s and r. That is, we consider the case with proportional
rationing.6 Also, we denote by γi, i = σ, β a seller’s and a buyer’s probability
of being successfully matched in the search market with probability λ. Thus,
for example a seller is matched with probability λγσ = λ min[
υ(Sβ)
υ(Sσ)
, 1]. Since
each agent has measure zero, αi and γi, i = σ, β can be taken as given by every
individual agent.
We first consider (ii) of Lemma 3 of Gehrig. Two cases can be distinguished,
the case where there is rationing at the intermediary’s, i.e. ασ < 1, and the case
where there is no rationing, i.e. ασ = 1. We consider the latter case first. Note
that s0 ∈ Sσ ⇔ γσUσ(s0) ≥ ασ(b− s0), where Uσ(s0) is the expected utility gain
of seller s0 of search market participation for υ(Sβ) = υ(Sσ). (For the case under
consideration now, we have ασ = 1.) Let F (r) be the cumulative distribution
function of buyers active in the search market. Then, we have
Uσ(s0) = λ
∫
s0≤r
r − s0
2
dF (r), and (4)
Uσ(s) = λ
∫
s≤r
r − s
2
dF (r). (5)
Because s > s0, Uσ(s0) > Uσ(s). Subtracting (5) from (4) we get
Uσ(s0)− Uσ(s) = λ
∫
s0≤r
s− s0
2
dF (r)− λ
∫
s0≤r≤s
sdF (r), or
Uσ(s) = Uσ(s0)− λ
∫
s0≤r
s− s0
2
dF (r) + λ
∫
s0≤r≤s
sdF (r).
Since s > 0, λ
∫
s0≤r≤s sdF (r) > 0, so that
Uσ(s) > Uσ(s0)− λ
∫
s0≤r
s− s0
2
dF (r).
Because λ
∫
s0≤r
s−s0
2
dF (r) < s− s0,
Uσ(s) > Uσ(s0)− (s− s0).
Multiplying both sides by γσ, 0 < γσ ≤ 1, we get γσUσ(s0) > γσUσ(s)−γσ(s−s0),
so that
γσUσ(s) > γσUσ(s0)− (s− s0).
6If rationing is efficient, then, for example, the q sellers with the lowest costs joining the in-
termediary will be able to sell with probability one, and all others with probability 0. Therefore,
the proof for the case with efficient rationing is much simpler than with proportional rationing.
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But s0 ∈ Sσ ⇔ γσUσ(s0) ≥ ασ(b − s0) (where for the case we are considering
ασ = 1). Therefore,
γσUσ(s) > (b− s0)− (s− s0) = b− s,
where b − s is the utility gain for s of joining the intermediary. Thus, s > s0
will not join the intermediary if s0 joins the search market. For buyers, the case
(i) under the assumption αβ = 1 is completely analogous and can be found in
Gehrig (1993, p.114/5).
Next, let us consider (ii) with ασ < 1. The utility gain of seller s from joining
the search market γσUσ(s) is certainly as great as the utility he gets when making
a deal in exactly the same matches as seller s0 does (in a sense, this is the value
s attributes to the expected deals s0 accepts).
7 That is,
γσUσ(s) ≥ γσλ
∫
s0≤r
r − s
2
dF (r)
= γσUσ(s0)− (s− s0)γσλ
∫
s0≤r
1
2
dF (r).
Now two cases have to be distinguished: (1) ασ > γσλ
∫
s0≤r
1
2
dF (r) and (2)
ασ ≤ γσλ
∫
s0≤r
1
2
dF (r). It will be shown first that in case (1) s will not join the
intermediary for s > s0 and second that in case (2), Sσ = Sβ = ∅.
For case (1), it is true that
γσUσ(s) > γσUσ(s0)− ασ(s− s0).
Add and subtract ασb on the right-hand side to get
γσUσ(s) > γσUσ(s0)− ασ(b− s0) + ασ(b− s).
But because s0 joins the search market, Uσ(s0) − ασ(b − s0) ≥ 0. Therefore,
γσUσ(s) > ασ(b− s), where ασ(b− s) is s’s expected utility gain from joining the
intermediary. Thus, for s > s0, s will not join the intermediary if s0 ∈ Sσ.
The case for buyers being completely symmetric, it will not be added here.
In case (2), for any seller s < s0 we would have
γσUσ(s) ≥ γσUσ(s0) + ασ(s0 − s)
= γσUσ(s0)− ασ(b− s0) + ασ(b− s).
7Note that s is not required to be greater than s0.
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Because s0 ∈ Sσ, γσUσ(s0) − ασ(b − s0) ≥ 0. Thus, γσUσ(s) > ασ(b − s) and
therefore, s ∈ Sσ for s < s0. Because this holds for any s < s0, then if s0 ∈ Sσ
for one s0, then Iσ = ∅. But this contradicts ασ = qυ(Iσ) < 1. Therefore, it must
be that Sσ = ∅. Completely analogous reasoning applies for buyers, establishing
that Sβ = ∅. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.¥
Note that Sσ = Sβ = ∅ and αi < 1, i = σ, β can happen only if a = b and
if for all s ≤ b, s ∈ Iσ and for all r ≥ a, r ∈ Iβ. Now all sellers s > b and
buyers r < a will be inactive, so that indeed r0 ∈ Zβ ⇒ r /∈ Iβ for r < r0 and
s0 ∈ Zσ ⇒ s /∈ Iσ for s > s0, which is just Gehrig’s Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1: These three Lemmas state that the sets of inactive
buyers and sellers and the sets of buyers and sellers active in the search market
are convex and directed sets. Therefore, only buyers with high reservation prices
and sellers with low costs can potentially gain by trading with the intermediary.
¥
Rationing in the Dynamic Game As a consequence of the dynamic struc-
ture, rationing occurs in a way slightly different from the one in Gehrig’s paper.
Sellers are rationed if and only if the ”number” of sellers willing to sell at bid
price b exceeds the capacity q the intermediary has set (i.e. iff υ(Iσ) > q), while
buyers are rationed if and only if the number of buyers willing to buy at ask price
a exceeds the quantity the intermediary has in stock, which is min[υ(Iσ), q]. This
is in contrast to the game in Gehrig’s setting, where rationing of sellers (buyers)
occurs if and only if υ(Iσ) > (<)υ(Iβ). Note that this is so independent of the
rationing rule that applies in case rationing occurs.
3.1 Input Supply and Output Demand Functions
For a > b, Gehrig’s Lemma 1 implies that all buyers with r ∈ [s, r] and all sellers
with s ∈ [s, r] are active in the search market so that Sβ = Sσ = [s, r]. Therefore,
in any equilibrium with a > b, γβ = γσ = 1. Moreover, because reservation prices
of all agents are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, we know that for r ∈
Sβ, r ∼ U [s, r] and for s ∈ Sσ, s ∼ U [s, r]. Therefore, dF (r) = 1r−sdr and dG(s) =
1
r−sds, where F (r) and G(s) are the cumulative distribution functions of buyers
and sellers active in the search market. Since all previous actions are assumed
to be observable, s and r will be known when agents decide whether to join the
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search market. Therefore, it suffices to condition this decision on s and r, so that
a strategy for seller s can be written as τs = (Is(b, q); Ss(a, b, q, s, r)). Similarly,
for a buyer a strategy can be written as ρr = (Ir(a, b, q, s); Sr(a, b, q, s, r)), and
for the intermediary, a strategy simplifies to ϕ = (q, b; a(s)). This allows us to
compute explicitly the expected utility gains from search market participation
and to characterize completely agents’ equilibrium strategies in the game. This
is what we do next.
We begin by briefly describing the equilibrium of the bargaining subgame.
With even sharing, a buyer r and a seller s who are matched in the search
market share the gains from trade r−s equally, provided r−s > 0. We will refer
to seller s and buyer r as the critical seller and buyer. The expected utility gain
for seller s with s ∈ [s, r] from search market participation is then
Uσ (s) = λ
∫ r
s
(r − s)
2
dF (r) =
λ
2
1
r − s
∫ r
s
(r − s)dr
=
λ
2
[
r2
2
− rs
]r
s
r − s =
λ
4
(r − s)2
r − s ,
which is the same as that derived by Gehrig under the alternative bargaining
schedule with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Thus, for the critical seller s we have
Uσ (s) =
λ
4
(r − s) . (6)
Likewise, for a buyer with reservation price r ∈ [s, r] the expected utility gain
from being active in the search market is
Uβ (r) = λ
∫ r
s
(r − s)
2
dG(s) =
λ
2
1
r − s
∫ r
s
(r − s)ds
=
λ
4
(r − s)2
r − s ,
so that for the critical buyer
Uβ (r) =
λ
4
(r − s) = Uσ (s) . (7)
Now, the utilities of critical buyers and sellers participating in the search mar-
ket in equation (7) can be used to derive the reservation prices of these agents
for joining the intermediary. If buyers and sellers joining the intermediary are
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rationed with probability αβ ≤ 1 and ασ ≤ 1, buyer r is indifferent8 between
joining the intermediary and joining the search market if and only if
αβ(r − a) = λ
4
(r − s) (8)
and seller s is indifferent if and only if
ασ(b− s) = λ
4
(r − s). (9)
For αβ = ασ = 1, solving equation (8) and (9) yields
a (r, s) =
4− λ
4
r +
λ
4
s and b (s, r) =
4− λ
4
s +
λ
4
r. (10)
Thus, a (r, s) and b (s, r) are reservation prices of buyer r and seller s for joining
the intermediary, given all s < s and all r > r have joined the intermediary and
provided there is no rationing.
Recall that we assume that buyers and sellers who are indifferent between
joining the intermediary and joining the search market join the search market.
If the intermediary quotes ask price a = a (r, s) and bid price b = b (s, r) and if
there is no rationing, buyers with r > r and sellers with s < s will then join the
intermediary. Note that if there is to be no rationing on the input market, the
capacity constraint q needs to be at least as great as s. On the other hand, the
quantity the intermediary sells on the output market cannot exceed the quantity
bought on the input market, which is denoted as qb. Note that this is the quantity
bought by the intermediary. Clearly, qb = min[s, q]. Thus, without rationing,
r ≥ 1− qb.
There being 1 − r buyers whose reservation prices are greater than or equal
to r, quantity demanded at ask price a (r, s) is 1− r. Let qd denote this quantity.
Note that this is quantity demanded at the intermediary’s. For the same reasons
as for buyers, there are s sellers who are willing to sell at bid price b (r, s),
provided the buyer with the highest reservation price in the search market is
buyer r. Therefore, s is equal to the quantity the intermediary can buy at the
bid price b (r, s), which is qb. If we replace r by 1 − qd and s by qb in equation
(10), we get the inverse output demand and (inverse) input supply functions
a
(
qd, qb
)
=
4− λ
4
− 4− λ
4
qd +
λ
4
qb (11)
8Throughout, we assume that all agents - buyers, sellers and the intermediary - are risk
neutral.
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and
b
(
qd, qb
)
=
λ
4
− λ
4
qd +
4− λ
4
qb, (12)
while the output demand and the input supply functions are
qd
(
a, qb
)
= 1− 4
4− λa +
λ
4− λq
b, (13)
and
qb
(
b, qd
)
= − λ
4− λ +
4
4− λb +
λ
4− λq
d. (14)
Note that the ask price elasticity of output demand, given qb, is
ε
(
a, qb
)
:= − 4a
4− λ− 4a + λqb . (15)
Note also that these functions are valid only under the provision that there is an
active search market from which some agents can expect positive utility gains.
This requires that r > s. If r ≤ s, agents lose the outside option of search market
participation. In this case, seller s would join the intermediary whenever b > s
and a buyer r will buy from the intermediary whenever a < r. Graphically, there-
fore, beyond the point of intersection of the (inverse) output demand function
a
(
qd, qb
)
with the (inverse) Walrasian demand function 1− qd, the willingness to
pay for intermediated trade is given by the (inverse) Walrasian demand function.
Therefore, the reservation prices of buyers an intermediary faces are actually
given by the maximum of these two functions
min
[
a
(
qd, qb
)
, 1− qd] . (16)
It is easy to verify that the intersection of a
(
qd, qb
)
with 1 − qd is at the point
where 1− qd = qb.
Analogously, the (inverse) input supply function b
(
qd, qb
)
in equation (12) is
valid only to the left of the intersection with qb. Beyond that point, expected
utility gain from search market participation in not positive, and the reservation
prices for trading through the intermediary are given by the (inverse) Walrasian
supply function. Hence, the sellers’ reservation prices the intermediary faces are
given by the maximum of these two functions
max
[
b
(
qd, qb
)
, qb
]
. (17)
Again, the point of intersection is where 1− qd = qb.
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1 
(Walrasian) 
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(Walrasian) 
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a(q)  
b(q)  
Figure 1: Walrasian and search market constrained demand and supply functions.
If quantity bought equals quantity sold, i.e. qd = qb = q, trade by the
intermediary is said to be balanced. In this case, the inverse demand and supply
functions are
a (q) :=
4− λ
4
− 2− λ
2
q (18)
b (q) :=
λ
4
+
2− λ
2
q. (19)
Under balanced trade, the input supply function is
qb (b) :=
4b− λ
2 (2− λ) , (20)
so that under balanced trade the inverse output demand function can be written
as a function of b only
a
(
qb (b)
)
= 1− b. (21)
Figure 1 depicts the Walrasian demand and supply functions and the search con-
strained output demand and input supply functions for the intermediary, under
the assumption that intermediated trade is balanced.
3 RESULTS 18
3.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Next, we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic intermediation
game. These are described in Proposition 2 below. We call the subgame that
begins after capacity has been built ”capacity constrained subgame” and show
that the capacity constraint subgame has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
with an active search market. Before we turn to Proposition 2, we state and
prove the following Lemmas.
Because whether or not there is rationing on the input side may affect output
demand, in principle we have to distinguish these two cases when analyzing the
output market subgame. However, as we show in Lemmas 4 and 5, whether or
not there has been rationing on the input side, it will not be in the interest of the
intermediary to ration buyers on the output market. That is, if the intermediary
has bought quantity q and if all s ∈ [0, s) have joined the intermediary (where
q < s), there is an ask price a such that a buyer wants to join the intermediary
if and only if r > 1− q. This result is summarized in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 For q ≤ s ≤ 1
2
and for a = 4−λ
4
(1−q)+ λ
4
s, in any equilibrium, r ∈ Iβ
if and only if r ∈ (1− q, 1].
Proof : Buyer r0 := 1−q is indifferent between joining the search market and
joining the intermediary, since r = r0 is the solution to
r − 4− λ
4
(1− q)− λ
4
s =
λ
4
(r − s).
Since we have assumed that indifferent buyers join the search market, r0 ∈ Sβ.
However, for any r > r0, the utility gain from joining the intermediary is greater
than the utility gain from search market participation. To see this, consider buyer
with r = r+0 , where r
+
0 denotes a reservation price marginally greater than r0.
His utility gain from buying from the intermediary is greater than his expected
utility gain from joining the search market under the hypothesis that he is the
critical buyer. Therefore, r = r+0 will join the intermediary. From Lemmas 2 and
3 it then follows that r ∈ Iβ for any r ≥ r+0 . ¥
Lemma 5 For a given r and a given s, buyer r’s reservation price for joining
the intermediary, a(r, s), is greatest if αβ = 1.
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Proof : Solving αβ(r − a) = λ4 (r − s) (see equation (8)) for a yields a =
4αβ−λ
4
r + λ
4
s. Clearly, this is greatest for αβ = 1. ¥
Together, Lemmas 4 and 5 state that (1) there is an ask price such that all
that has been bought (with or without rationing on the input side) can be sold
without rationing on the output market and that (2) rationing of buyers is not
in the intermediary’s interest because it only decreases the reservation price of
buyer r for joining the intermediary.9 Thus, the intermediary will not set an ask
price below the one at which he can sell everything. What has not be shown,
however, is whether it is in the intermediary’s interest to sell everything he has
bought (i.e. to set an ask price such that qd = qb). Lemma 6 states the condition
under which the intermediary wants to sell everything.
Lemma 6 The unique subgame perfect ask price function for the intermediary
is
a∗
(
qb
)
= max
[
a (q) ,
1
2
]
,
for any qb.
Proof:
By assumption, there are no costs involved with disposing any quantity the
intermediary cannot sell. It is also assumed that there are no costs associated
with selling. Therefore, if the quantity bought allows him to do so (that is,
if qb is large enough), the monopolistic intermediary will sell exactly the quan-
tity for which elasticity of output demand is −1. (Otherwise, he will set the
market clearing price, which is greater than the price at which elasticity is -1.)
The intersection between the (inverse) output demand function and the (inverse)
Walrasian demand function in (16) being given by
qd = 1− qb,
this intersection occurs at qd < 1
2
for qb > 1
2
. Thus, for qb > 1
2
,
min
[
a
(
qd, qb
)
, 1− qd] = 1− qd.
9Note that this does not involve any quantity effects, yet; a(r) decreases not because more
buyers have to be attracted by the intermediary in order to have rationing, which in turn
requires a to go down. Merely because he is less likely to get served does the reservation price
of r for joining the intermediary decrease.
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That is, the relevant (inverse) demand function is the (inverse) Walrasian demand
function, the elasticity of which is −1 for a = 1
2
. Hence, for a
(
qd, qb
)
> 1 − qd,
a∗
(
qb
)
= 1
2
.
For qb < 1
2
, the relevant inverse demand function is a (q). The elasticity of
output demand is -1 (see equation (15) above) for
a =
4− λ + λqb
8
∣∣∣∣
qb∈[0,1]
≤ 1
2
,
but for qb < 1
2
, a ≤ 1
2
will not be market clearing. Without selling less, therefore,
the intermediary can increase a up to the price for which a = a (q), where a(q) is
the ask price function for balanced trade as defined in (18). But because in this
range, demand is elastic, the intermediary has no incentive to increase a beyond
this point and to sell less than qb, so that for a
(
qd, qb
)
< 1− qd, a∗ (qb) = a (q).
¥
What is not yet clear is under which conditions a seller will decide to join the
intermediary. Inspection of the inverse input supply function b(s, r) in (10) shows
immediately that this decision depends among other things on the reservation
price of the critical buyer active in the search market, r. But since this price
depends on the quantity the intermediary sells (which depends on the quantity
he buys), this reservation price depends in turn on the decision of all sellers to
join or not to join the intermediary, which in turn depends on their expectations
what the intermediary and buyers will do in stage 2 of the game, and so on. This
is a potential source of indeterminacy: If all other sellers with s < s sell, then
selling might be optimal for an individual seller, while if all others do not sell,
then not selling will be optimal for him as well. However, based on the insights
provided by Lemmas 4 and 6, the following Lemma shows that this indeterminacy
disappears.
Lemma 7 For q ≤ q ≤ 1
2
and b = b(q), s ∈ Iσ if and only if s ∈ [0, q), where
b(q) is as defined in (19).
Proof: The proof consists of a iterating the same argument. The argument
consists of two parts.
(1) There exists a set of sellers with positive measure whose dominant strategy
is to sell at bid price b(q), even if all buyers are active in the search market (i.e.
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even if the intermediary does not sell anything). Formally, ∃ s1 > 0 such that
λ
4
(1− s) ≤ b(q)− s for all s ≤ s1. To see this, solve λ4 (1− s1) = b(q)− s1 for s1
to get s1 =
2(2−λ)
4−λ q > 0. Note that unless λ = 0, s1 < q.
(2) By virtue of Lemmas 4 and 5 the intermediary will want to sell everything
he has bought and the buyers with r ∈ (1 − s1, 1] will join the intermediary.
Therefore, the buyer with the highest reservation price active in the search market
will be r = 1 − s1. Given this, ∃ s2 > s1 such that λ4 (1 − s1 − s) ≤ b(q) − s
for all s ∈ (s1, s2]. To see this, solve λ4 (1 − s1 − s2) = b(q) − s2 to get s2 =[
1 + λ
(4−λ)
]
2(2−λ)
(4−λ) q > s1 for λ > 0.
(3) Iterating step (1) and (2) n times, we get
sn+1 =
[
1 +
λ
4− λ +
(
λ
(4− λ)
)2
+ ... +
(
λ
(4− λ)
)n]
2 (2− λ)
(4− λ) q
=
[
n∑
i=0
(
λ
(4− λ)
)i]
2 (2− λ)
(4− λ) q.
Let n go to infinity. Since 0 < λ
(4−λ) < 1 for λ > 0, limn→∞
∑n
i=0
(
λ
(4−λ)
)i
= 4−λ
2(2−λ)
so that limn→∞ sn+1 = q. ¥
Lemma 7 eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria present in Gehrig’s original
model (in the capacity constrained subgame).10 Note that in determining sk, k =
1, ..., n the fact that the intermediary will sell what the sellers with s ∈ [sk−1, sk)
sell has not been used.
There is a resemblance between this mechanism and a suggestion made by
Spulber (1999, p.125), who says that
... inventory holdings by intermediaries could reduce buyer and seller
concerns about being rationed, which could also alter the equilibrium
outcome.
Due to the sequential structure of the game, the intermediary can be seen as
holding inventories at the beginning of the output market subgame. At least some
buyers then have a dominant strategy to buy from the intermediary. Sellers in
turn take this into account when making their decisions to sell to the intermediary.
In a sense, by selling to the intermediary and through the intermediary’s inventory
10Without variable costs of building capacity, there is a continuum of capacity constraints
the intermediary can set in equilibrium.
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holding, sellers can induce the buyers to buy from the intermediary and thereby
to leave the search market.
Next we show that rationing will not occur on the input market for q ≤ 1
2
.
Lemma 8 Bid prices b > b(q) cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy.
Proof : Because we know from the previous Lemma that with b = b(q) the
intermediary buys q when setting b(q), b > b(q) has no quantity effect. The only
positive effect it has for the intermediary is that it increases s in case sellers with
s > s are attracted and thereby increases a(r, s). The negative effect is, of course,
that it is a higher bid price, which by itself decreases the intermediary’s profits.
It can be shown that the negative effect outweighs the positive effect: For s to be
indifferent between joining the intermediary and the search market, this requires
the following equality to hold
ασ(b− s) = λ
4
(1− q − s),
where we have used the fact that the intermediary will sell on the output mar-
ket what he has bought on the input market (see Lemmas 4, 5 and 6). Note
that ασ =
q
s
. Plugging this expression in we get after some re-arranging b =
s
(
λ
4
1
q
+ 4−λ
4
− λ
4
s
q
)
. Define this function as b(s, q). Bid price b > b(q) will not
pay if
a(q, s)− b(s, q) < a(q)− b(q),
where a(q, s) := 4−λ
4
(1− q) + λ
4
s like in Lemma 4.11 This inequality implies
4− λ
4
− 4− λ
4
q − 2− λ
2
s− λ
4
s
q
(1− s) < 2− λ
2
− (2− λ)q
⇔
−2− λ
2
s− λ
4
s
q
(1− s) < 4− λ
4
(1− q)− 2− λ
2
q.
But because s > q, −2−λ
2
s < −2−λ
2
q. Therefore, if the inequality
−λ
4
s
q
(1− s) < 4− λ
4
(1− q)
11Strictly speaking, for b > b(q) not to pay, a(1− q, s)−max[b(s, q), s] < a(q)− b(q) suffices,
which certainly holds if the above inequality holds; see (17) above.
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holds, then b > b(q) does not pay. Since the right-hand side is positive for any
q < 1, while the left-hand side is negative for any s ∈ (0, 1), the inequality holds
always. Therefore, b > b(q) does not pay.¥
What remains to be determined is the optimal bid price b∗ and the capacity
constraint q the intermediary sets in stage 1. We first consider the optimal bid
price and then the optimal capacity constraint.
Lemma 9 The optimal bid price is b∗ = 1
4
+ λ
8
. If b = b∗, all sellers with reser-
vation prices s < 1
4
will sell to the intermediary.
Proof: We can neglect the constraint q ≤ q∗, which can still be chosen
accordingly. (We only have to assume that q is large enough so that quantity qb
can be bought.) We observe first that bid prices b inducing qb (b) > 1
2
cannot be
optimal. For if the bid price b is such that qb (b) > 1
2
, the intermediary’s profits
are
π (b) = [a− b] qb (b) =
[
1
2
− b
]
qb (b) ,
where a∗
(
qb
)
= 1
2
∣∣
qb> 1
2
has been used. But for qb (b) > 1
2
, the search market shuts
down (because r <s) and sellers’ reservation prices for intermediated trade are
given by b = qb (see (17) above). Therefore, profits are
π (b) =
[
1
2
− qb
]
qb
∣∣∣∣
qb> 1
2
< 0,
which cannot be an optimum given the intermediary’s outside option of π = 0.
Second, by Lemma 8 bid prices b > b (q) can be ruled out. Given a∗
(
qb
)
=
max
[
a
(
qd, qb
)∣∣
qd=qb
, 1
2
]
in the second stage of the game (see Lemma 6) and given
that for any bid price b (q)|q≤min( 1
2
,q), q sellers are willing to sell to him (see Lemma
7), the intermediary’s first stage maximization problem is
max
b
π (b) = [a (q (b))− b] q (b) ,
where q (b) is given by (20) and a (q (b)) is given by (21). Thus,
π (b) = [1− 2b] 4b− λ
2 (2− λ) .
The first order condition is
0 =
2− 8b + λ
2− λ ,
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and the second order condition
(− 8
2−λ < 0
)
is satisfied as well, so that b∗ = 1
4
+ λ
8
and q (b∗) = 1
4
. ¥
Note that Lemma 9 implies that equilibrium profits are π∗ (b∗) = 2−λ
16
and
equilibrium quantity traded is 1
4
, provided the capacity constraint is greater than
or equal to 1
4
.
What therefore remains to be determined is the optimal capacity constraint
q∗. Since we have assumed no costs of building capacity, any capacity constraint
greater than or equal to 1
4
will allow the intermediary to earn his the equilibrium
profits π∗. Therefore, in any equilibrium, q∗ ≥ 1
4
.
Together with the modified Proposition 1 of Gehrig, Lemmas 4 through 9
imply that the capacity constrained subgame of the dynamic intermediation game
has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with an active search market. This
equilibrium is summarized in the following Proposition. Let ϕ | q be a strategy
of the intermediary in the capacity constrained subgame and assume q ≥ 1
4
.
Proposition 2 For q ≥ 1
4
, the capacity constrained subgame of the dynamic
intermediation game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with an active
search market, in which
τ ∗s = (I iff b ≥ max [b (q) |q≥q>s, s] , S iff r > s) ∀s ∈ [0, 1]
ρ∗r =
(
I iff a ≤ min [a (q) |r≥1−qb , 1− r
]
, S iff r > s
) ∀r ∈ [0, 1] and
ϕ∗ | q = ( b = 1/4 + λ/8, a∗(qb) = a(q)) ,
where the functions a (q) and b (q) are the inverse demand and inverse supply
functions as defined in equation (18) and (19) above.
Because capacity building is costless, there is a continuum of otherwise iden-
tical subgame perfect equilibria in the full game. In all of these equilibria, the
intermediary sets q∗ ≥ 1
4
.
Proof : From Lemma 4 we know that if the s ≥ qb = q sellers with the
lowest reservation prices have joined the intermediary and thereby cannot be on
the search market, there is an ask price a(q, s) such that buyer r will join the
intermediary if and only if r > 1 − q. Lemmas 5 and 6 state that rationing on
the output market (which would occur only if a < a(q)) and selling less than
the quantity he has bought (which would occur only if a > a(q)) is not in the
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Figure 2: The equilibrium outcome.
intermediary’s interest, provided q ≤ 1
2
. This establishes that a∗(qb) = a(q) for
q ≤ q ≤ 1
2
. Lemma 8 says that rationing on the input market is not in the
intermediary’s interest, so that b ≤ b(q) in equilibrium. Lemma 9 determines the
optimal bid price and the quantity traded by the intermediary, while Lemma 7
establishes uniqueness in the capacity constrained subgame. Finally, from the
modified Proposition 1 of Gehrig we know that all low cost sellers and all buyers
with high reservation prices deal with the intermediary and that those sellers and
buyers with average reservation prices are active in the search market, while the
remaining traders are not active. ¥
In this equilibrium, quantity traded by the intermediary is 1
4
. All sellers with
reservation prices s < 1
4
and buyers with reservation prices r > 3
4
trade with
the intermediary. The ask price set by the intermediary is 3
4
− λ
8
, and the bid
price 1
4
+ λ
8
. Sellers and buyers with reservation prices s, r ∈ [1
4
, 3
4
]
are active in
the search market and sellers with valuations s > 3
4
and buyers with reservation
prices r < 1
4
remain inactive. The intermediary’s equilibrium profits are 2−λ
16
, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
The intermediary trades with the subsets of buyers Iβ and Iσ. The sets of
buyers and sellers active in the search market are Sβ and Sσ, while the sets of
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sellers and buyers Zβ and Zσ remain inactive. Note that there are other payoff
equivalent equilibria, which are, however, not subgame perfect. For example,
setting a(qb) = 3
4
− λ
8
would induce the same equilibrium payoffs. But if e.g.
qb < 1
4
− z, where z is a positive number smaller than 1
4
, a(qb) = 3
4
− λ
8
is not
optimal, so that a(qb) = 3
4
− λ
8
is not a subgame perfect strategy.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have modified the Gehrig (1993) model by imposing a sequential
structure. According to this modification, a monopolistic intermediary first sets
a capacity constraint and a bid price. Up to the capacity constraint, the inter-
mediary is committed to buy any quantity sellers are willing to sell to him at the
bid price he sets. The intermediary starts selling only after having finished the
acquisition of the inputs. As a consequence of this structure, the capacity con-
strained subgame has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with an active search
market. This is in contrast to the original model, which exhibits a multiplicity
of equilibria (which are not payoff equivalent). In addition, we have addressed
a problem concerning rationing and the structure of the model (see Appendix
A.2). We consider the following extensions. In a companion paper, we introduce
competition between capacity constrained intermediaries. As another extension,
one could introduce a fix cost of search market participation. Further extensions
could introduce asymmetric information or analyze the model for (more) general
distributions of buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices.
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Appendix
A Intermediation and Rationing
A.1 Excursion on Rationing
Rationing occurs whenever the price is such that the market does not clear.
Though either side of the market can get rationed, rationing is more often dis-
cussed as occurring on the demand side.
A.1.1 Rationing on the Output market
Typically, economists describe rationing by a rule which states what parts of
demand get served at the (non-market clearing) price. Such a rule is called a
rationing rule. In the literature, basically two rationing rules are used (see e.g.
Tirole, 1988; Vives, 1999). One rule is often called random or proportional ra-
tioning rule (PR for short), and the other one efficient rationing rule (ER). The
difference between the two rules is easiest to see by investigating the differences
between the residual demand functions. These functions depict what part of
the market demand remains unserved after rationing has occurred. Assume that
there are two sellers selling given stocks q1 and q2 at prices p1 and p2. Let market
demand be D (p) and assume p1 < p2. If we are to have rationing at price p1, it
must be that D (p1) > q1. In this case and under PR, seller 2 faces the residual
demand function
DRPR (p1, p2, q1) = D (p2)
D (p1)− q1
D (p1)
, (22)
while under ER, seller 2 faces the residual demand function
DRER (p2, q1) = D (p2)− q1. (23)
That is, under ER the buyers with the highest reservation prices get served at
the non-market clearing price p1, while under PR a proportional fraction of all
buyers with willingness to pay greater than p1 get served, where proportional
means that q1
D(p1)
of all buyers willing to pay p1 get served, and 1 − q1D(p1) get
rationed.
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A.1.2 Rationing on the Input market
Rationing on the input market is completely analogous. Let S(p) be the aggregate
supply function for an input factor and let q1 and q2 be capacity constraints such
that firm i cannot buy more than qi. Then, assuming p1 > p2 and S(p1) > q1
(for otherwise there is no rationing) the residual supply function firm 2 faces is
under PR and
SRPR (p1, p2, q1) = S (p2)
S (p1)− q1
S (p1)
, (24)
and under ER it is
SRER (p2, q1) = S (p2)− q1. (25)
A.2 Rationing and the structure of the basic model
As mentioned above (see footnote 4), the assumption that rationed traders cannot
go back to the search market is crucial. This point deserves some emphasis
because it may help prevent misunderstandings. Note that Gehrig (1993, p.106)
writes:
... intermediaries may ration the long side and send unsuccessful
traders back to the search market
and Spulber (1999, p.121) says:
Those rationed by the intermediary can move on to the matching
market.
We now show that (1) that the assumption that ”rationed traders are sent
back to the search market” would not fit with the remainder of Gehrig’s analysis
and (2) that the assumption that rationed traders cannot go back to the search
market is crucial for the model. We begin with (1).
If some agents, e.g. sellers, are rationed at the intermediary’s with probability
(1 − ασ), the expected utility gain for seller s from joining the intermediary is,
according to Gehrig (1993, equations (3.1), (3.2) and (A.2))
Wσ(s) := ασ(b− s). (26)
But if s can join the search market if he gets rationed, then his utility gain from
joining the intermediary is rather
Wσ(s) = ασ(b− s) + (1− ασ)γσUσ(s),
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because with the probability that he gets rationed he joins the search market,
where he grasps expected utility gain γσUσ(s).
12
But even more importantly, if agents can join the search market after being
(proportionally) rationed by the intermediary, this affects the expected utility
gains from search market participation. Assume again that sellers are rationed,13
so that the fraction (1 − ασ) of sellers with reservation prices s < s will subse-
quently be active in the search market. The consequences of this will be first that
all buyers with r ∈ (0, s] will join the search market, so that the set of inactive
buyers is reduced to the buyer with r = 0. All other buyers can now expect
positive utility gains from search market participation. Thus, Gehrig’s Proposi-
tion 1 would not hold (or only hold for a case with measure zero), since r were
almost 0. Second, there would be more buyers than sellers active in the search
market, which by itself is not a problem. However, the reservation prices of sellers
active in the search market were no longer uniformly distributed. Rather, this
distribution would have a kink at s. In Gehrig’s setting with take-it-or-leave-it
offers, this has a third consequence, namely that the optimal offers for buyers
active in the search market are hard to compute if rationing occurs (and if a
proportional rationing rule applies). Thus, it will not be trivial to compute the
expected utility from search market participation for the critical buyer r, which
will certainly not be Uβ(r) =
λ
4
(r − s).
This gets us to the claim (2), namely that the assumption that rationed
traders cannot go back to the search market is crucial for the model. Suppose
they could. Then, rationing on the input side would have two effects for the
expected utility gain from search for buyers. The positive effect for buyers is that
the set of sellers active in the search market increases, so that all else equal, their
utility increases. The negative effect is that the probability of being successfully
matched, γβ ≡ min[υ(Sσ)υ(Sβ) , 1], decreases, since now there are more buyers active in
12Interestingly, rationing would so far not affect the reservation price to deal with the inter-
mediary, provided γσ = 1 with or without rationing. To see this, consider the critical buyer s
for whom
ασ(b− s) + (1− ασ)Uσ(s) = Uσ(s)
holds, so that as before b− s = Uσ(s).
13In Gehrig’s and Spulber’s setting, the game is played in simultaneous moves, so that it is
immaterial on which side rationing occurs. But in the dynamic game of this paper, rationing
of buyers is not a credible threat by the intermediary because it is not time consistent. This is
why we concentrate here on rationing of sellers.
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the search market than sellers, implying γβ < 1.
For a seller s, the expected utility gain from search decreases because there
are more buyers with r ≤ s active in the search market, so that the probability
of being matched to a buyer with whom he cannot engage in mutually beneficial
trade increases.
Since the reservation prices to trade with the intermediary increase as the
utility gain from search market participation decreases, it is in the intermedi-
ary’s interest to make this utility gain small. The cost of inducing rationing on
the input side is, of course, that the intermediary has to pay a bid price above
the one at which the market (or capacity) clears. However, with proportional
rationing and without fix cost of search market participation, it suffices to set b
only marginally above the market clearing price. Then, ασ < 1, which induces
all buyers with r ≤ s to join the search market. In the limit as lim ασ → 1,
therefore, υ(Sσ) = r − s and υ(Sβ) = r, so that γβ < 1, which unambiguously
decreases buyers’ utility gain from search market participation and thus increases
their reservation prices for buying from the intermediary. Therefore, if rationing
is proportional and if rationed traders can join the search market, it would be in
the interest of the intermediary to (marginally) ration the input side. Thus, the
assumption that rationed traders cannot join the search market is crucial for the
model.
B Rubinstein Alternating Offers Bargaining
Following Freixas and Rochet (1997), we have assumed that buyers and sellers
who are matched share the gains from trade evenly, if there are any such gains
(i.e. if r − s > 0). Alternatively, we could assume that when two traders are
successfully matched, the reservation prices r and s are common knowledge to
both parties. Provided r > s, the buyer and the seller engage in a Rubinstein
alternating offers bargaining game, where they have the same discount factor δ.
The player who can make the first move is determined by flipping a fair coin.
The reason for assuming that the player to make the first offer is determined by
chance is merely that it allows us to get rid of the discount factor δ outside the
bargaining subgame.
When a seller s and a buyer r meet, they have a cake of size (r − s) to
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share, if r > s. Otherwise, they cannot engage in mutually beneficial trade, and
the search market ends without utility gain for both of them. Let the common
discount rate be δ. Then, if the buyer is given the chance to make the first offer,
he offers himself 1
1+δ
(r − s), leaving δ
1+δ
(r − s) to the seller. That is, the price
pr the buyer sets solves
r − pr = 1
1 + δ
(r − s) ,
so that
pr =
δr + s
1 + δ
,
which the seller accepts. On the other hand, if the seller is given the chance to
make the first offer, he gives himself the fraction 1
1+δ
of the cake and leaves δ
1+δ
to the buyer. That is, the seller sets a price ps that solves
ps − s = 1
1 + δ
(r − s) ,
so that
ps =
r + δs
1 + δ
.
Let the chance that a buyer or a seller can make the first offer be equal. Then,
the price a buyer or a seller can expect on average if a match is successful (i.e. if
r > s), is
1
2
(pr + ps) =
1
2
(
δr + s
1 + δ
+
r + δs
1 + δ
)
=
r + s
2
.
See also Rubinstein (1982), Shaked and Sutton (1984), Mas-Collel et al. (1995,
p.298) and Gibbons (1992); Spulber (1999) introduces Rubinstein bargaining into
a model in this spirit.
B RUBINSTEIN ALTERNATING OFFERS BARGAINING 32
B.1 Expected utility gain from Search
The expected utility gain for a seller s with s ∈ [s, r] from search market partic-
ipation is then
Uσ (s) =
λ
2
∫ r
s
(ps − s) 1
r − sdr +
λ
2
∫ r
s
(pr − s) 1
r − sdr
=
λ
2
∫ r
s
(ps + pr − 2s) 1
r − sdr =
λ
2
∫ r
s
(r − s) 1
r − sdr
=
λ
2
[
r2
2
− rs
]r
s
r − s =
λ
4
(r − s)2
r − s ,
which is the same as in the Gehrig model.
Thus for the critical seller s
Uσ (s) =
λ
4
(r − s) .
Likewise, for a buyer with reservation price r ∈ [s, r] the expected utility gain
from being active in the search market is
Uβ (r) =
λ
2
∫ r
s
(r − ps) 1
r − sds +
λ
2
∫ r
s
(r − pr) 1
r − sds
=
λ
2
∫ r
s
(2r − pr − ps) 1
r − sdr
=
λ
2
∫ r
s
(r − s) 1
r − sds
=
λ
4
(r − s)2
r − s ,
so that for the critical buyer
Uβ (r) =
λ
4
(r − s) = Uσ (s) .
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